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Corporate Power Unbound: 
Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines –  
Eli Lilly and the TPP 
Professor Brook K. Baker* 
Draft May 17, 2013 
 
I. Brief Historical Background and Framework of International Investment 
Agreements and Investor-State Dispute Resolution 
 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) typically contain 
investment clauses designed to attract direct foreign investment and protect the interests of 
foreign investors.1  In addition to defining the types of foreign investment that are entitled 
to protection, investment clauses typically allow for both state-state and investor-state 
dispute resolution, meaning that if a foreign investor believes that its investment has been 
unlawfully devalued by government action it can directly launch arbitral proceeding against 
the offending government before a private panel of trade lawyers. Typical claims under 
investment clauses address:  (1) alleged violations of a minimum standard of treatment 
for foreign investors, i.e., fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security – 
which, most States have agreed, requires police protection and adjudicative due process; (2) 
direct or indirect expropriation, including what we call in the U.S. regulatory takings; and 
(3) national treatment or most favored nation which requires host governments to afford 
foreign investors treatment that is no less favorable than that afforded to domestic 
corporations in similar circumstances or no less favorable treatment than that afforded to 
investors from another state that has an investment agreement with the host government.  
International investment treaties also frequently mandate free flow of capital, now 
recognized as having contributed to asset bubbles and global financial insecurity, and place 
restrictions on prudent capital controls, now officially endorsed by the International 
Monetary Fund as legitimate tools for preventing and mitigating financial crises..  Finally, 
the treaties greatly restrict performance requirements designed to promote domestic 
inputs as a condition of foreign investment activity. 2 
                                                        
* Professor, Northeastern U. School of Law, affiliate Program on Human Rights and the Global Economy; 
honorary research fellow University of KwaZulu Natal; Senior Policy Analyst, Health GAP (Global Access 
Project). 
1 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITRs Really Work?:  An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67-130  (2005); Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. 
Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811-846 
(2006).  
2  
United States Bilateral Investment Treaties are designed to ensure that investments provide six basic 
benefits, often referred to as the “core” BIT principles: 
• First, our BITs provide that investors and their "covered investments" (that is, investments of a 
national or company of a Party in the territory of the other Party) are entitled to be treated as favorably 
as the host Party treats its own investors and their investments or investors and investments from any 
third country. The BIT generally affords the better of national treatment (NT) or most favored nation 
(MFN) treatment for the full life cycle of investment, i.e., from its establishment or acquisition, through its 
management, operation and expansion, to its disposition. 
• Second, BITs establish clear limits on the expropriation of investments and provide for payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation when expropriation takes place. 
• Third, BITs provide for the transferability of funds into and out of the host country without delay 
using a market rate of exchange. This covers all transfers related to a covered investment and creates a 
predictable environment guided by market forces. 
• Fourth, the circumstances in which performance requirements can be imposed are limited. The 
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The vast majority of investor-state dispute resolution claims are handled by the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), although there are 
alternative arbitral forums, regional and otherwise.3  Most investment treaties allow 
recourse to ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration without first exhausting local judicial or 
administrative remedies, a right frequently not allowed to domestic investors either with 
respect to exhaustion or post-exhaustion review.  Typically, a panel of three arbitrators is 
chosen to establish an investor-state dispute resolution tribunal, often from a surprisingly 
small pool of international trade lawyers. 4 Decisions are non-reviewable except through 
annulment proceedings that address a narrow range of tribunal “errors” and are not heard 
by judges but by another arbitral tribunal. 5   Although arbitral decisions are not 
precedential, panels frequently cite other tribunal decisions even as they ignore the 
opinions of sovereign States to ratchet up investor protections.   
 
Investor-state dispute resolution is facing a crisis of credibility given its perceived bias 
towards investor prerogatives, but the analysis here focuses not on legitimacy debates as 
such,6 but rather on a particular threat to access to medicines if pharmaceutical companies 
                                                                                                                                                                     
performance requirement disciplines apply to specific circumstances that would require covered 
investments to adopt inefficient and trade distorting practices (e.g., local content requirements or export 
quotas) as a condition for establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, or operation. 
• Fifth, BITs give investors from both Parties the right to submit an investment dispute with the 
treaty partner's government to international arbitration. There is no requirement to use that country's 
domestic courts. 
• Sixth, BITs give covered investments the right to engage the top managerial personnel of their 
choice, regardless of nationality. 
United State Trade Representative, Bilateral Investment Treaties, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties.  
3 The ICSID arbitration rules are contained in the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. 532 (entered into force 14 October 
1966) [ICSID Convention] and the rules created by the ICSID Administrative Council pursuant to arts. 6(1)(a) to 
(c) of the ICSID Convention, Administrative and Financial Regulations, Rules of Procedure for the Institution of 
Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings; Rules of Procedure for Arbitration. These rules are published in ICSID, 
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Doc. ICSID/15 (Washington: ICSID, 2006). The ICSID Additional Facility 
for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding Proceedings was created by the ICSID 
Administrative Council on 27 September 1978.  ICSID Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, 
Arbitration and Fact-Finding Proceedings, Doc. ICSID/11 (Washington: ICSID, 1979). Schedule C of the ICSID 
Additional Facility, sets out the Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules. On 5 April 2006, the Administrative 
Council approved amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the Additional Facility Rules creating greater 
transparency and allowing amicus participation in ICSID proceedings for the first time, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.  For a critique and review of the 2006 revisions, see J. 
Anthon VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and 
Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681 (2007). 
   An alternative international system for investor-state arbitration is pursuant to United National Commission 
on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbitration Rules (2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf.   There 
are several regional mechanisms for investor-state arbitration as well.   
4 Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice, Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe 
Observatory Report, 8 (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.tni.org/pressrelease/exposed-elite-club-lawyers-
who-make-millions-suing-states.   
5 Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 355, 364 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2002) (expressing concern over the 
absence of appellate review in the investor-state arbitration context). 
6 Cf. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigations in a Public Law Sphere:  The Standard of 
Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283 (2010) (arguing for a “margin of appreciation” 
standard of review); Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & LEGAL 
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pursue investor-state claims.  More specifically, the analysis focuses on pro-investor draft 
investment chapter in an ongoing regional trade negotiation – the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP)7 - and on the first investor-state arbitral claim ever by a patent-holding 
pharmaceutical company under a U.S. free trade agreement, demonstrating the danger of 
investment claims in the pharmaceutical context.8   
 
The investor-state regime was ostensibly established to encourage direct foreign 
investment and thereby facilitate the efficient and free flow of capital to its most productive 
uses. By allowing private investors to seek remedies before purported neutral arbiters, 
foreign investors could avoid asset expropriation and adjudicative injustice.   Larcenous and 
lawless governments would be deterred from confiscating hard-earned foreign investments 
and become compliant with or at least obedient to the rule of law.  In the context of a global 
“development agenda,” investment clauses were believed to provide a level of security that 
would incentivize foreign direct investment in the real economy and financial markets of 
low- and middle-income countries thereby speeding the financing and development of 
comparative advantage and lubricating participation in the expanding global economy.9  
The number of BITs and other international investment agreements has proliferated 
reaching 2833 at the end of 2011.10  The resulting complex web of agreements allows 
investors to shop for investment provisions that are most advantageous to them and, if 
necessary, set up a subsidiary for the purpose of asserting a preferred protected foreign 
status.  Alternatively, most favored nation rules permit an investor to argue that it is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 47 (2010) (arguing for adoption of a proportionality review balancing public and private 
interests); Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate:  Revisiting Proportionality 
Analysis and the Standard of Review of Investor-State Arbitration, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 223-255 (2012) (arguing for a 
more deferential application of proportionality review taking into account “host state authorities’ greater 
democratic legitimacy and proximity to host state communities, and tribunals’ comparatively weak institutional 
capacity”). 
7 According to the United State Trade Representative website, “On November 12, 2011, the Leaders of the nine 
Trans-Pacific Partnership countries – Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States – announced the achievement of the broad outlines of an ambitious, 
21st-century Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that will enhance trade and investment among the TPP 
partner countries, promote innovation, economic growth and development, and support the creation and 
retention of jobs.”  See http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-
trans-pacific-partnership.   Since that time, Mexico and Canada, the U.S.’s NAFTA trade partners have also joined 
the negotiations.  Japan has also recently asked to participate in the negotiations, see “Statement by Acting U.S. 
Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis on Japan’s Announcement Regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership” 
(March 15, 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/march/amb-
marantis-statement-japan-tpp.   Other countries, including Thailand, are said to be interested.  The U.S. is 
reportedly urging South Korea to join the talks as well.  Park Hyun & Seong Yeon-cheon, “To counter China, US is 
seeking to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and wants SK as a partner,” THE HANDKYOREH (March 21, 
2013) available at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/579052.html.  The 15th round of 
negotiations was held in Singapore, March 4-13, 2013, with the 16th round scheduled in in Lima, Peru in May 15-
24, 2013.  For an outline of the broad parameters of the TPP, see http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement.  For a detailed analysis by 
the Congressional Research Service, see Ian F. Feargusson et al., THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS AND 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (March 19, 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf.  
8 The investor-state claim is Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a 
Claim to Arbitration under NAFTA (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1172.pdf.  [Hereinafter Eli Lilly v. Canada.] 
9 Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing 
countries?, 33 WORLD DEVEL. 1567-85 (2005). 
10 United National Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2012 Overview:  Toward a 
New Generation of Investment Policies, 18 (2012), available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-
WIR2012-Overview-en.pdf.  
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entitled to the benefit of the “best” investment clause protections that the host country has 
granted to investors from any other state.11 
 
Although modern investment clauses and investor-state dispute resolution have been with 
us since the 1950s, resort to them was limited during their first 50 years when only fifty 
investor-state claims were filed.12  Investors reserved their claims for those exceptional 
cases where hard investments were nationalized or transferred to others without 
compensation by regimes either committed to state ownership or captured by crony 
capitalism. In contrast, since 2001, four hundred investor-state disputes have been filed.  
Investors have won nearly $3 billion from taxpayers in arbitral awards and another $15 
billion in claims is pending under U.S. FTAs and BITs alone.13  Moreover, the average cost of 
arbitral proceedings is nearly $8 million, although the Philippines’ tribunal costs and legal 
costs in a single case exceeded $50 million.14   
 
This sea change in investor-state claims occurred because investors belatedly realized that 
not only could they bring claims against banana-republic confiscations but against emerging 
economies and even advanced democracies whenever their unrequited expectations of 
profits were thwarted by government regulations, adverse adjudicative decisions, and other 
state practices.  Accordingly, foreign corporations have used investor-state dispute 
resolution to challenge a broad array of environmental and land use laws, government 
procurement decisions, regulatory permitting, financial regulations, consumer protection, 
                                                        
11 Robert Stumberg, MFN in the TPP Investment Chapter (2012) draft available from the author, citing Most-
Favoured Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Investment Issues in International Investment Law II (2010); Pia 
Acconci, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Peter 
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer, eds., 2008).  
12 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, IIA Issues Note: Latest Developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement, 3 (April 2012), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf.   The history of protecting international 
investments is much longer than the history of bilateral investments treaties.  See Kenneth J. Vandeveld, 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:  HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION, Ch. 2 (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2010). 
13 See Public Citizen, Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA and Other U.S. Trade Deals 
(March 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf.   The fact that an 
investor-state arbitral award has been issued does not necessarily mean that it has yet been paid.  However, 
$380 million has been paid out to investors under US FTAs and these are only a subset of investor-state awards.  
See Public Citizen, Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA and other U.S. Trade Deals 
(March 2013), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf.  Many arbitral claims 
are settled, post-award, and others are enforced by being reduced to a court judgment that can thereafter be 
executed against state property, subject to some foreign sovereign immunity issues.  See Vincent O. Nmehielle, 
Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International Covenant for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID 
Convention), 7 AN. SURVEY INT’L & COMP. L. 21-48 (2001).  According to a 2008 PriceWaterhouseCoopers study, 
host states have complied with about 90% of investment arbitration awards rendered against them.  See 
International Arbitration:  Corporate attitudes and practices (2008), available at 
http://www.academia.edu/262767/PricewaterhouseCoopers_International_Arbitration_Corporate_Attitudes_a
nd_Practices.   
     A recent study from UNCTAD shows a sharp uptick in new investor-state arbitration cases in 2012, 62 new 
cases initiated, with a total of 518 known cases having been filed.  UNCTAD, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NO. 1 (March 2013), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf. Most of the cases were against 
developing or transition economies.  Forty-two arbitral decisions were issued in 2012. Of those decided on the 
merits, 70% were decided in favor of investors, including a $1.77 billion award in Occidental v. Ecuador (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/01), Award, 5 October 2012.  To date the total number of concluded cases has reached 244, of 
which approximately 42% were decided in favor of the State, approximately 31% in favor of the investor, and 
approximately 27% settled.   
14 Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 4 at 7.   
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public health, and public safety laws, and a range of other public interest policies.15  Claims 
in extractive industries are common. For example, Churchill Mining has filed a $2 billion 
claim against Indonesia relating to its mining regulations.16 ICSID recently ordered Ecuador 
to pay Occidental Petroleum $1.77 billion in a disagreement over an oil concession contract 
in the largest investor-state award to date.  Claims relating to environmental and public 
health hazards are also common.  One prominent public health example is the pending 
arbitral claim against Australia under a 1993 Australia-Hong Kong bilateral investment 
treaty brought by an affiliate of Phillips Morris challenging plain packaging restrictions on 
tobacco products.17  Phillips Morris is pursuing its 2011 arbitral claim despite the 
Australian High Court having confirmed the constitutionality of the Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Act of 2011.18 In the infamous Metalclad v. Mexico case, a U.S. toxic waste disposal firm 
challenged a Mexican city’s refusal to grant a construction permit for a toxic waste facility 
until and unless the firm cleaned up pre-existing toxic waste problems that it knew about 
when it purchased the property from a previous polluter. In an earlier instance, Canada 
reversed an environmental ban on a gasoline additive MMT, a probable carcinogen, after 
U.S. Ethyl Corporation filed a NAFTA investor-state claim against it.   
 
Although many investor-state cases implicate public health and safety, prior to 2012 no 
patent-holding pharmaceutical company had filed an investor-state challenge under any 
U.S. FTA based on alleged intellectual property rights.  That moratorium ended in November 
2012, when Eli Lilly and Company announced its intent to initiate arbitration proceedings 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment clause to attack 
Canada’s invalidation of a patent on an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder medicine 
called Strattera.19  In doing so, Eli Lilly is challenging a well-established patent rule in 
Canada, the so-called promise doctrine, whereby a medicine or any other product’s “utility,” 
and thus patentability, must be demonstrated or soundly predicted at the time of filing a 
patent.20  Eli Lilly makes a number of specific investment chapter claims, discussed further 
below, including that the Canadian ruling involved a violation of a minimum standard of 
treatment, indirect expropriation, and discrimination in violation of national treatment 
norms.  The analysis below will first address the provisions in the Draft TPP Investment 
                                                        
15 Id. 
16 Churchill Mining PLC v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 (2012), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1479.  
17 See Tania Voon, Acquisition of Intellectual Property Rights:  Australia’s Plain Tobacco Packaging Dispute, 2 Eur. 
Intel. Prop. J. * (forthcoming 2013); Patricia Randall, The Australian High Court tobacco plain packaging decision 
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Paper presented at the Stakeholders Forum, Fourteenth round of 
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in Leesburg, Virginia (September 9, 2012), available at  
http://aftinet.org.au/cms/sites/default/files/Leesburg%20Ranald%20forum%20paper%20090912.pdf.  
18 J. T. International S. A. v. Commonwealth of Australia; British American Tobacco Australasia Limited v. 
Commonwealth of Australia, HCA 43 (2012).  Phillips Morris has a second, tobacco-related investor-state case 
that it filed earlier against Uruguay under a different BIT (Swiss-Uruguay), which is shows the willingness of 
foreign corporations headquartered in one country to treaty shop for corporate affiliates that are domiciled in 
another state with favorable investment treaty provisions.  Request for Arbitration, FTR Holdings S.A. 
(Switzerland) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID case no. ARB/10/7 (February 19, 2010).  FTR Holding S.A. is 
a subsidiary of Philip Morris International Inc. (PMI) and PMI has its Operation’s Center in Switzerland. 
19  The challenged court decision is Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Canada Ltd., 2011 FAC 220, available at 
http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/en/2011/2011fca220/2011fca220.pdf.  The Supreme Court of Canada denied 
review.  Eli Lilly Co. v. Teva Canada Ltd., available at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/cms-sgd/dock-regi-
eng.aspx?cas=34396.  The investor-state claim is Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 8.  Chapter 11 of NAFTA adopted 
investor-state arbitration. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the 
Government of Mexico, and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1194 No.2, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (entered into force January 1, 1994). 
20   Id. 
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Chapter and their theoretical risk to access to medicines and then examine those risks in 
light of the actual claims asserted by Eli Lilly against Canada. 
 
II. The Leaked Draft Trans-Pacific Partnership Investment Chapter is a Booby-
Trap for Access to Medicines 
 
The leaked TPP Intellectual Property Chapter proposed by the U.S. has been analyzed 
extensively with respect the dangers it poses in terms of access to medicines21 and with 
respect to its IP enforcement provisions.22  Similarly, the leaked Draft TPP Investment 
Chapter23 has also been closely analyzed primarily with respect to the generic dangers of its 
extra-judicial investor-state dispute settlement provisions.24  This analysis expands on 
earlier investor-state critiques and focuses on the particular risks the Investment Chapter 
poses with respect to access to medicines, especially in light of the direct and indirect 
inclusion of IPRs in the Chapter’s coverage.  These risks are cumulative to existing IP 
enforcement risks and burdens, because investor-state dispute resolution offers unique 
remedies beyond enhanced private enforcement mechanisms (mandatory injunctions and 
expanded damages) and beyond heightened enforcement undertaking by governments 
(state-state dispute resolution, border measures, and criminal enforcement). In essence, the 
inclusion of intellectual property rights granted in the US TPP IP Chapter gives IP-
“investors” new substantive “investment rights” that they could now directly, selectively, 
and cumulatively enforce against sovereign governments’ regulations, policies, and 
adjudicatory decisions using Draft TPP Investment Chapter investor-state dispute 
resolution.   
 
There are five main dangers in the Draft TPP Investment Chapter that threaten access to 
medicines: 
 First, the minimum standard of treatment provision, including fair and equitable 
treatment, and the indirect expropriation standard contain significant ambiguities that 
could greatly restrict countries’ ability to enact, use, and defend lawful flexibilities that 
enhance access to medicines.   
 Second, national treatment and most favored nations provisions can be interpreted to 
prevent unanticipated forms of alleged discrimination against foreign investors. 
                                                        
21 Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter February Draft, available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf; Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Intellectual Property Rights Chapter September 2011 Draft (Selected Provisions), available at 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf [hereinafter US TPP IP 
Chapter]. With respect to substantive IP issues affecting access to medicines, there are proposals to relax 
standards of patentability, to eliminate certain patent exclusions, to extend patent terms to compensate for 
regulatory delays, to limit required disclosures, to forbid pre-grant opposition procedures, and to require data 
exclusivity and patent-registration linkage, all TRIPS-plus measures.  See Sean M. Flynn, Brook Baker, Margot 
Kaminski & Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L.R. 105, 149-183 (2013).   
22 With respect to enforcement issues affecting access to medicines, there are proposals to mandate injunctions, 
to authorize seizures and other measures at the border, and to require enhanced civil remedies and expanded 
criminal enforcement.  Flynn et al. supra note 21, at 183-200.   
23 Draft TPP Investment Chapter, available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf.  
24 See e.g. Public Citizen, Public Interest Analysis of Leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Investment Text (June 
13, 2012), available at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/gtwtppinvestmentanalysis.pdf; Jane Kelsey, New TPP Leaked Text: National Says ‘Yes’ 
to Investor Rights to Sue (June 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1206/S00186/national-says-yes-to-investor-rights-to-sue.htm.  
 7 
 Third, it is dangerous to cross-reference and incorporate IP rights into the investment 
chapter, given the extensive private and public enforcement rights that rightholders 
already have and given drug companies’ proclivities to bring lawsuits against 
governments.25   
 Fourth, the bracketed limited exception to IP-related investment rights for compulsory 
licenses and patenting decisions does not provide the security against investor claims 
that TPP Parties might need in order to truly safeguard lawful measures that promote 
access to affordable medicines for all set forth in the TRIPS Agreement and further 
clarified in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.26   
 Fifth, the Investment Chapter prevents certain performance requirements that in the IP 
context might give developing countries leeway to develop domestic pharmaceutical 
capacity in order to ensure a self-sufficient and uninterrupted supply of medicines and 
to promote industrial development and diversification. 
 
A. The “minimum standard of treatment/fair and equitable treatment” standard 
and indirect expropriation standard contain dangerous interpretive 
ambiguities that could negatively impact government policies and decisions 
affecting access to medicines. 
 
Article 12.6.1 of the Draft TPP Investment Chapter requires that, as a “minimum standard of 
treatment,” “Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with 
customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
                                                        
25 Using just India as an example, Bayer unsuccessfully sued India to achieve judicially mandated patent-
registration linkage, a suit that was dismissed in the Delhi High Court with special leave to appeal dismissed by 
the Supreme Court of India.  Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, 41 P.T.C. 634 (Del. 2009); Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, 
9 February 2010, LPA 443/2009; Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s) 6540/2010; see Mabel 
Tsui, Access to medicine and the dangers of patent linkage:  Lessons from Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, 18 J. LAW & 
MED. 577-88 (2011); Anshul Mittal, Patent Linkage in India:  Current Scenario and Need for Deliberation, 15 J. 
INTEL. PROP. RGTS. 187-96 (2010). Bayer has also initiated an appeal to the Indian Patents Appeal Board seeking 
reversal of a compulsory license granted to Natco on its cancer medicine, Nexavar (sorfenib tosylate).  IPAB 
Judgment available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/045-2013.htm.  Bayer has indicated its intention to appeal to 
the High Court.  “Patent board rules against Bayer in cancer drug case,” REUTERS (March 4, 2013), available at 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/india-patent-appeal-bayer-nexavar-idINDEE92309H20130304. 
Novartis sued India in 2006 to invalidate Section 3(d) of the Indian Amended (2005) Patents Act on the grounds 
that it was unconstitutional and violated of the TRIPS Agreement.  That suit was dismissed by the Madras High 
Court in 2007.  Novartis AG v. Union of India, 4 Madras L.J. 1153 (2007); see Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, 
“Ducking” TRIPS In India:  A Saga Involving Novartis and the Legality of Section 3(d), 20 NAT’L LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA 
REV. 131-155 (2008).  Although Novartis declined to appeal the High Court decision, it did continue to appeal the 
denial of a patent on its cancer medicine, Glivec.  That appeal has had a tortured history culminating in an appeal 
to the Supreme Court of India, which dismissed Novartis’s effort both to obtain a patent on Glivec and to 
motivate a change in the interpretation of section 3(d) of the India Patents Act that would make it easier to 
evergreen patents on medicines thereby extending periods of exclusive rights.  Novartis v. Government of India, 
Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 OF 2013 (April 1, 2013), available at 
http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/outtoday/patent.pdf.  This decision was received jubilantly by access to 
medicines activists, but received harsh criticism from Novartis and its supporters.  See Patralekha Chatterjee, 
Novartis Loses Patent Bid:  Lessons from India’s 3(d) Experience, IP-WATCH (April 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/04/01/novartis-loses-patent-bid-lessons-from-indias-3d-experience/.  
26 WTO Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 8(1), Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS]; Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, Nov. 9-14 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01_e.htm [hereinafter Doha Declaration].   
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security.”27  Although subparagraph 1 does not require treatment in addition to or beyond 
that required by customary international law, subparagraph 2(a) interprets “fair and 
equitable treatment” to include “the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process 
embodied in the principal legal systems of the world.”28  Investor-state tribunals have used 
increasingly expansive interpretations of this “minimum standard of treatment” that depart 
further and further from the “customary international law” actually practiced by States, 
despite a U.S.-sponsored annex, first inserted in the Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), defining customary international law as resulting from the “general and consistent 
practice of States” (compare Annex 12-B in the Draft TPP Investment Chapter).29  Indeed, in 
the recent ruling on the Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala case 
brought under CAFTA, an investor-state tribunal simply ignored the CAFTA annex and 
arguments from four governments that the minimum standard of treatment for foreign 
investors needed to be based on state practice, opting instead to borrow a more expansive 
interpretation of the standard from another tribunal.30    
 
That more elastic interpretation of the minimum standard of treatment came from the 2004 
NAFTA case known as Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States II.31  In its award, 
the tribunal defined a violation of the minimum standard of treatment as entailing state 
conduct that is “arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and 
exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process 
leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety.”32  The tribunal noted that this 
might be the case where there has been a “manifest failure of natural justice in judicial 
proceedings or a complete lack of transparency or candor in an administrative process.”33  
More problematically, the tribunal decided that if a state breaches “representations” that 
were “reasonably relied upon” by investors at the time of investment, that breach 
constitutes evidence of unfair or inequitable conduct that violates the minimum standard of 
treatment.34  Some commentators, citing other expansive tribunal decisions, argue that the 
minimum standard of treatment goes so far as to protect the “reasonable expectations” of 
an investor even in the absence of direct representations, let alone binding commitments 
allowing unfettered and immutable market participation or profit-making opportunities.35  
Such expansive interpretations of the “minimum standard of treatment” have made these 
claims an investor favorite.  In nearly 75% of the investor-state cases that a foreign investor 
has “won” under U.S. FTAs and BITs, the tribunal cited a “minimum standard” violation to 
rule against the respondent Party.36     
                                                        
27 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  For a chronology of tribunals’ elastic interpretations of the minimum standard of treatment, see Public 
Citizen, “Memorandum on “Fair and Equitable Treatment” and Investors’ Reasonable Expectations: Rulings in 
U.S. FTAs & BITs Demonstrate FET Definition Must be Narrowed” (September 2012), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/MST-Memo.pdf?iframe=true&width=100%&height=100%. 
30 For more information on the case and its expansive interpretation of the minimum standard, see Public 
Citizen, Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) v. Guatemala, available at http://www.citizen.org/RDC-vs-
Guatemala#!prettyPhoto[iframe]/0/. 
31 Decision available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf.  
32 Id. ¶ 89. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Fiona Campbell, Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Agreements, Institute for 
Sustainable Development (2007), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/inv_fair_treatment.pdf.  
36 See Public Citizen’s memo: http://www.citizen.org/documents/MST-
Memo.pdf?iframe=true&width=100%&height=100%.   
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In the pharmaceutical context, foreign investors might claim that the “minimum standard of 
treatment” covers their reasonable expectations for future profits arising from the granting 
or even filing of intellectual property claims. Changing or re-interpreting substantive IP 
standards or guidelines judicially, administratively deciding pre- or post-grant patent 
oppositions in favor of challengers, or adjudicating exceptions to granted rights  might all be 
interpreted as violating a minimum standard of treatment.  In sum, whenever foreign IP 
rightholders disagree with judicial or administrative decisions or think that those decisions 
are insufficiently transparent or candid, the foreign rightholder could potentially bring 
investment chapter claims directly against the government without ever being required to 
even exhaust domestic appeal mechanisms.   
 
These concerns are no longer purely speculative.  A major international corporate law firm, 
Jones Day, has directly counseled pharmaceutical companies about foreign investor claims 
they might bring against India: 
[T]he basic patentability standards of the TRIPs agreement have been guaranteed to 
Novartis’ investments in India ever since India agreed to become TRIPs-compliant in 
2005; denying a patent in violation of those standards therefore may constitute a 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. In Bayer’s case, the sheer 
length of time for which the compulsory license was granted to the Indian 
company—i.e., the “balance term of the patent”—and the fact that no national health 
“emergency” exists to justify such a license over a “non-life saving drug,” are just 
two reasons to suggest that India has run afoul of Article 31 of TRIPs.37 
 
Article 12.12 of the Draft TPP Investment Chapter also prohibits direct and “indirect 
expropriation” of a covered investment, which includes failure to pay full market value 
upon expropriation. 38 Although there is an exception in subparagraph 5 with respect to 
“compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with 
the TRIPS Agreement,” this exception would not appear to cover exceptions to data 
exclusivity or patent-registration linkage rights nor many other patent related claims.  Even 
the broader bracketed portion of subparagraph 5, which includes an exception to the 
expropriation rule for “the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, 
                                                        
37 Jones Day Commentary, “Treaty Protection for Global Patents:  A Response to a Growing Problem for 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies,” 3 (October 2012), available at 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/96b88f45-3c81-4e6e-b640-
9ca243920ad5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/523d7608-c58a-4bab-bd96-
9e1d121287ea/Treaty%20Protection.pdf.  The Novartis v. India case, discussed supra note 25, involved the 
denial of an evergreening patent on Glivec, an important cancer medicine.  The Bayer case referred to involves 
india first grant of a compulsory license, also on a cancer medicine.  Id.  What’s striking about the Jones Day 
advice is that it’s so inaccurate on the law.  Although TRIPS Article 31, supra note 26,  does allow patent holders 
to seek termination of a compulsory licenses when the conditions giving rise to license have abated, there is no 
stated limitation in TRIPS on the duration of a license.  Even more clearly, Article 31 contains no requirement 
whatsoever that compulsory licenses on medicines can only be granted for “emergencies” or that they are 
limited to lifesaving medicines.  (Note:  it is frankly bizarre that Jones Day would suggest that Bayer’s cancer 
drug is not a life-saving drug since extended life is something that Bayer has consistently claimed since it 
brought its medicine to the market.)  Compulsory licenses under TRIPS can be granted for non-emergency 
conditions routinely, but unlike licenses granted in emergencies or for public, non-commercial use or to remedy 
anti-competitive behavior such licenses require an attempt to negotiate a voluntary license with the patent 
holder on reasonable terms.  Likewise, compulsory licenses can be granted on medicines that respond to any 
health need, not just life-saving need.  Both of these points were directly addressed and clarified in the Doha 
Declaration, supra note 26, at ¶ 5. 
38 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23. 
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to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with 
Chapter __ (Intellectual Property Rights),”39 as important as it may be if adopted, does not 
give rights to create novel exceptions to intellectual property rights in the absence of full 
remuneration.  Pursuant to the indirect expropriation rule, it would become unlawful, 
arguably, to create a new public health exception to data exclusivity or to require disclosure 
of the international proprietary name of active pharmaceutical ingredients on medicines-
related patents.  Likewise, payment of partial liability payments or royalties would not 
suffice to escape indirect expropriation strictures.  Finally, the subparagraph 5 language 
would not prevent the foreign IP-investor from advancing even more fanciful 
interpretations of what is “inconsistent” with the IP Chapter as we will see further below 
with respect to the Eli Lilly v. Canada investor complaint. 
 
Possible meanings of indirect expropriation are addressed further in proposed Annexes 12-
B, C, and D and clarify the imperative to protect investor expectations.  Annex 12-C is the 
most far reaching clarification and requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers 
subparagraph 4(a) factors:   
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or 
series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred; (ii) the extent to which government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations (emphasis added); and (iii) the character 
of the government action.40 
Subparagraph (b) sets some loose boundaries on those expectations: 
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect the legitimate public welfare objectives [23 For 
greater certainty, the list of legitimate public welfare objective in this subparagraph 
is not exhaustive] such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not 
constitute indirect expropriations.41   
Although this public welfare exception helpful, it is not an absolute privilege.  Investors can 
claim:  (1) that their cases are the rare ones where even non-discriminatory regulation is 
not permitted, (2) that the regulatory actions are discriminatory, e.g., targeted solely at or 
disproportionately applied to pharmaceutical investors, or (3) that the interests being 
protected are not legitimate.   
 
To give concrete examples, if a compulsory license were granted on a medicine pursuant to 
the Paragraph 6 System,42 would that be deemed confiscatory?  Some commentators have 




42 A special waiver was adopted by the WTO on August 6, 2003, providing for compulsory licenses permitting 
export/import of unlimited exportation of specified quantities of particular medicines when the importing 
country has insufficient manufacturing capacity to operationalize a domestic compulsory license.  WTO 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. [Hereinafter Paragraph 6 System.] See 
Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines:  Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 613-715 (2004).  
Although an amendment based on the Paragraph 6 System was proposed in 2005, Article 31bis, it has not yet 
been ratified by sufficient number of WTO members to become effective.  I use this example because even if the 
compulsory license exception is adopted in the Draft TPP Investment Chapter it is not clear that Paragraph 6 
System licenses would be judged to have been issued “in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement.” 
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suggested that compulsory licenses in general should be considered a taking, others not,43 
but what if the compulsory license displeased the foreign patent holder’s legal sensitivities 
in some regard?  To use another example, if a compulsory licensing regime were to have a 
local working requirement – as is true in India and Brazil, a foreign pharmaceutical investor 
might claim this objective was a rare, challengeable circumstance, or that is evidenced 
discriminatory bias in favor of domestic firms, or that local working requirements violate 
TRIPS Article 27.1 by discriminating against imports. Likewise, if facially neutral 
compulsory licensing rights were used more routinely to grant pharmaceutical-related 
licenses, as has occurred in Indonesia, which recently issued compulsory licenses on seven 
different hepatitis and antiretroviral medicines,44 the pharmaceutical investor might claim 
field-of-technology “discrimination” in violation of Article 27.1.  Finally, if the royalty rate 
did not adequately compensate for lost profits from a drug company’s perspective, 
especially in comparison to the much higher absolute value of royalty rates in commercial 
transactions, the royalty rate might be deemed confiscatory.45   
 
Jones Day has practical advice for transnational drug companies with respect to such 
compulsory-license-based indirect expropriation claims: 
Because exclusivity is a central feature to an intellectual property asset like a patent, 
the grant of a compulsory license significantly devalues that asset, and thus arguably 
“ha[s] an effect equivalent to … [an] expropriation” under international law. In that 
situation, “compensation … shall be equivalent to the value of the expropriated … 
investment immediately before the date on which such expropriation … became 
publicly known” A nominal 6 percent royalty—which Bayer received as 
compensation for the Nexavar compulsory license—may arguably fall below this 
threshold and give rise to an actionable claim for indirect expropriation.46  
Jones Day goes further and explains that the issuance of the Bayer compulsory license might 
also have denied Bayer effective means to protect its rights within the domestic legal 
system since it was not granted interlocutory injunctions against the production of generic 
medicines during the pendency of its appeals.47 
 
B. Foreign investor’s rights to national treatment and to most favored nation 
treatment authorizes imaginative discrimination claims 
 
Article 12.4 contains the relevant definitions of National Treatment: 
1. Each Party shall accord to investor of another Party treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the 
                                                        
43 Cf. Peter B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITS:  An Essay on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International 
Arbitration, 13 N.C. J. LAW & TECH. 149 (2012) with Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in 
Investment Arbitration:  The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT’L L.R. 357-422 (2010). 
44 Public Citizen, Breaking News:  Indonesia Licenses Patents for Seven HIV & Hepatitis B Medicines – Precedent-
Setting Government Order has Extraordinary Lifesaving Potential (2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/PC-
statement-on-compulsory-licensing-in-Indonesia.  
45 For a discussion of royalty rates, see James Love, Remuneration Guidelines for Non-Voluntary Use of a Patent on 
Medical Technologies, WHO Health Economics and Drugs TCM Series No. 18 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf.  
46 Jones Day Commentary, supra note 37, at 3 (citations omitted). This claim by Jones Day is also far-fetched 
since compulsory licenses have been expressly authorized by international treaties, including the Paris 
Convention, since the late 19th century and compulsory licensing rules were enshrined in Indian law well before 
Bayer applied for its patent on Nexavar.  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 5(a)(2). 
47 Id. 
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establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale 
or other disposition of investments in its territory. 
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in 
its territory.  (Emphases added.)48 
In sum national treatment prevents favoritism toward domestic investors compared to 
foreign investors.  On this grounds, as argued by Jones Day, compulsory licenses granted to 
domestic companies,49 especially pursuant to local manufacturing requirements, would 
violate national treatment – domestic generic firms would obtain investment advantages 
that the foreign originator firm does not have unless it sets up a local manufacturing 
facility.50  Similarly, the denial of a patent or invalidation of a patent owned by a foreign 
inventor by a national patent office or court might result in a national treatment 
discrimination claim if domestic inventors were allegedly being treated more favorably in 
similar circumstances.   
 
Most-favored nation treatment is defined in Article 12.5: 
1. Each Party shall accord to investor of another Party treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors of any other Party or of any 
non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favourable than that 
it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of investors of any other 
Party or of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its 
territory. 
3. For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article does not encompass 
international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms such as those include in 
Section B [referencing customary international law which arises from “a general and 
consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation”]. 
(Emphases added.)51 
MFN allows investors to expand their rights beyond those negotiated in a particular treaty 
by shopping for better investment rights in other international investment agreements 
and/or in other kinds of agreement incorporated by reference into the investment chapter 
or related provisions.  Investors in the past have used MFN to seek better procedural 
treatment, expanded scope of protection, and stronger substantive rights.  For example, one 
expanded right that might be available are so-called pre-establishment rights, which 
provide foreign investors with enforceable minimum guarantees of access to the market via 
removal of barriers to entry and a certain level of predictability, security, and transparency 
                                                        
48 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23. 
49 Granting compulsory licenses to local firms is completely lawful under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
though it is also lawful to issue a compulsory license to a foreign company and to import the medicine.  This 
importation strategy is easily pursued if there is no patent in the foreign country where the foreign licensee is 
located.  If there is a patent, a compulsory license would have to be issued to the same manufacturer by the 
exporting country.  See Brook K. Baker, Processes and Issues for Improving Access to Medicines:  Willingness and 
Ability to Utilize TRIPS Flexibilities in Non-Producing Countries, U.K. Dept. for Int’l Development, Health Systems 
Resource Centre (2004) 
50 Jones Day Commentary, supra note 37, at 3.  
51 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23. 
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as to entry conditions.   In other words, pre-establishment protections ensure that an 
investor can get its foot in the door.52  This right is particularly important for foreign IP right 
holders who have a firm sense of entitlement once they have received a patent in a patent 
friendly country like the U.S.  For example, to support its claim for patent protection in India 
on Glivec, Novartis made much of the fact that Glivec had been patented by “40 other 
countries.” 
 
C. The implicit and explicit inclusion of IP rights as protected investments is deeply 
problematic with respect to medicines 
 
The Article 12.2 definition of “investment” is broad enough to cover medicines-related 
intellectual property rights (patents, data and other trade secrets) in that it only requires 
“commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk (emphasis added).”53  Pharmaceutical inventions typically involve 
investment of capital or other resources during the research and development process.  
Similarly, by granting rights to exclude others, IPRs certainly create an expectation of gain 
or profit – indeed an expectation of monopoly rents.  Accordingly, unless IP rights are 
expressly excluded from the investment chapter and from the definition of “investment,” 
there is a risk that IPRs, which routinely require both commitments of capital and an 
expectation of profit, would be implicitly covered.  In this regard, it is also important to 
point out that the definitions of covered “investors” covers pre-establishment rights, rights 
that arise even before the foreign investment has been made.54 
 
However, the proposed definition of investment goes further to directly reference: (g) 
“intellectual property rights [which are conferred pursuant to domestic laws of each 
Party].”55  The unbracketed text protecting any and all intellectual property rights is 
problematic in at least five ways, given uncertainty about the intended breadth of its 
coverage.   
 
First, “intellectual property rights” could be interpreted over broadly to include all of the 
IPRs codified in the loose language of the TRIPS Agreement.  For example, TRIPS Agreement 
Art. 39.3 currently provides data protection against “unfair commercial use” for undisclosed 
data compiled at consideration expense and submitted to regulatory authorities.  Major 
transnational pharmaceutical companies and EU and US trade negotiators have consistently 
interpreted this language as requiring data exclusivity – monopoly control over the data so 
as to prevent regulatory reliance on or reference to the data when considering a generic 
company’s attempt to register an equivalent product.   Many other countries and leading 
expert commentators believe that Art. 39.3 does not require data exclusivity, a protection 
explicitly rejected during the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.56  At present, the only 
                                                        
52 See Andrew Paul Newcombe, Lluís Paradell, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:  STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 
137-139 (Kluwer Law Int’l, the Netherlands, 2009). 
53 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23. 
54 The definition of investor of a Party and investor of a non-Party both reference “an investor that attempts to 
make” an investment in a country.  Footnotes 7 and 8 both clarify:  “For greater certainty, the Parties understand 
that an investor ‘attempt to make’ an investment when that investor has taken concrete action or actions to 
make an investment, such as channeling resources or capital in order to set up a business, or applying for 
permits or licenses.”  Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See e.g., Carlos Correa, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS:  IMPLEMENTING THE 
STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002); Brook K. Baker, Ending drug registration apartheid – taming data 
exclusivity and patent/registration linkage, 34 AM. J. LAW & MED. 303-344 (2008). 
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way that this interpretive battle can be decided multilaterally is for an aggrieved WTO 
Member to bring a WTO complaint against another Member, such as India, which refuses to 
provide data exclusivity.  However, despite intense industry lobbying on this issue, the 
Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has initiated only one such 
complaint against Argentina and subsequently abandoned it57 because of concerns that it 
would lose and because of other complex political calculations that structure a Member’s 
decision to fully prosecute a WTO complaint or not.   
 
However, if the Draft TPP Investment Chapter is adopted, even if the US proposal for data 
exclusivity in its IP Chapter were to be rejected, a foreign pharmaceutical company could 
bring an extra-judicial arbitral claim (e.g. violation of reasonable expectations covered by 
the minimum standard of treatment) against a TPP Party based on an interpretive dispute 
whether TRIPS requires data exclusivity.  In fact, Bayer sought a related, judicially imposed 
rule on patent-registration linkage in India and lost.58  The company would hope that the 
revolving-door trade lawyers selected to lead the investor-state dispute resolution tribunal 
would adopt the company’s position despite convincing expert opinion and widespread 
state practice to the contrary.  In essence, the foreign investor will have gained an 
alternative forum for seeking to enforce novel interpretations of TRIPS and thereby gain 
new data monopolies.  The foreign pharmaceutical IP-investor, in all probability from the 
US or Europe, would have rights that no domestic pharmaceutical company would have.  
The foreign IP-investor could choose to appeal an adjudicatory loss and thereafter still seek 
separate investor-state arbitration or it could avoid the appeal process entirely and go 
straight to arbitration. 
 
Second, not only might the loose and sometimes ambiguous language of TRIPS be 
interpreted expansively to justify an investor-state arbitral proceeding, but that same 
foreign IP investor might over-strenuously interpret the expanded IP rights conferred by 
the TPP itself.59  For example, a Party might decide that it has a public-health flexibility – 
and a human rights need – to enact an exception to TPP-based data exclusivity rights in the 
event of the issuance of a TRIPS- or TPP-compliant compulsory license.  The adversely 
affected “investor” might conclude that the express language of the TPP IP chapter does not 
authorize such an exception and that the failure to pay total compensation (not a mere 
royalty) is an indirect expropriation or alternatively, if the decision were adjudicatory, that 
its reasonable expectations of data-based market exclusivity has been violated.  This latter, 
minimum-standard-of-treatment claim would be strengthened since there is little 
international state practice at present of enacting exceptions to data exclusivity. Once again 
a U.S.-based foreign investor would not need to convince the USTR to file a WTO or TPP 
                                                        
57 The United States brought a WTO complaint against Argentina on the grounds that Argentinian law had no 
exclusivity for test data. (30) After almost 2 years, the dispute was settled at the consultation stage and without 
a hearing. On May 2002, the Governments of the U.S and Argentina agreed "should Argentinean law be 
inconsistent with Article 39.3 ... Argentina agrees to submit to the National Congress within one year an 
amendment to Argentinean law, as necessary, to put its legislation in conformity with its obligations under 
Article 39.3." See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set Forth in the 
Agreement, 20 June 2002, (IP/D/18/Add. 1, IP/D/22/Add. 1), available at 
www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=18205. As expected, Argentina did not accept the U.S. claim 
that exclusive rights should be granted for test data and left its law unchanged.  
58 Tsui, supra note 25, at 577-88. 
59 This possibility has strong support in another section of the Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23, Art. 
12.12.5, which, in bracketed text, creates an exception with respect to remedies for direct or indirect 
expropriation pertaining to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent 
that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with the IP chapter.   
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state-to-state dispute – it could do so unilaterally; moreover, it could bypass the Party’s 
judicial procedures and jump straight into pro-industry arbitral proceedings.  The company 
would bet that the revolving door justice of non-democratically selected arbitrators, who 
move seamlessly from representing IP rightholders, advising and representing 
governments, and putting on the false cloak of arbitral neutrality, would prevail.  Worse yet, 
the mere threat of such a lawsuit could deter Parties from adopting lawful public health 
flexibilities that they might otherwise believe exist in the TPP because of the prohibitive 
costs of arbitral hearings and the risk of excessive judgments should they lose. 
 
Third, a foreign pharmaceutical investor might simply rely on the TPP-compliant law of the 
TPP Party and claim that its investor rights had been infringed by an adverse decision on a 
pending IP claim.  For example, if the TPP IP chapter requires countries to allow patents on 
new forms of existing medicines, a patent office might still conclude that a particular new 
polymorph form lacks an inventive step.  The pharmaceutical company could argue that the 
TPP-compliant national law actually creates a presumption in favor of patentability of new 
forms and thus that it has an expectation of profit from exclusive rights on an evergreening 
patent.  Instead of challenging the denial of its secondary patent application in court, the 
company could jump over that step and immediately charge dilution of its putative – but not 
yet granted – IP rights and expectations of profit in investor-state arbitration. 
 
Fourth, there is a risk that a foreign IP rightholder might bring claims because of what it 
considers to be inadequate enforcement, e.g., the failure to criminally prosecute a 
trademark counterfeiter because of scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources or a failure 
to impose the level of damages that the IP rightholder proposes.  Although the TRIPS 
Agreement mainly relies upon private enforcement, e.g., the creation of a procedurally fair 
judicial system for the private prosecution of IP infringement claims, the US TPP IP Chapter 
creates multiple new enforcement rights with respect to civil remedies, criminal sanctions, 
and border measures.  Failure to provide “fair and equitable treatment” in “criminal, civil, or 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principles of due process” 
constitutes an actionable minimum standard of treatment violation under Draft TPP 
Investment Chapter Article 12.6.2(a).  Paradoxically, a government could face foreign 
investor claims for failure to unilaterally enforce what are fundamentally private rights – no 
longer could Parties use their TRIPS-compliant right not to prioritize publicly funded IP 
enforcement.60  Note as well, how cumulative IP-investors rights now are:  (1) they can 
bring private claims based on longer, broader, easier-to-obtain, and longer patents rights 
and on new data exclusivity rights and they can get enhanced damages, injunctions, and 
seizure orders; (2) they can pursue stronger party-initiated border measures that could 
include seizures of goods in transit and rely on ex parte, sua sponte border measures by 
customs officials and seek criminal enforcement of IP rights; (3) when frustrated, they can 
lobby for state-to-state dispute resolution under the TPP; and (4) they can now challenge 
the state directly with investor-state dispute resolution and/or seek state-state investment 
arbitration.  Although IP right-holders already have unique and special enforcement rights 
under the US TPP IP Chapter, now they get super-sized enforcement with investor-state 
arbitration. 
 
                                                        
60 Id., Article 41.5:  “It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system 
for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor 
does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation 
with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the 
enforcement of law in general.” (Emphasis added.) 
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Fifth, there is a risk that an IP rightholder might bring a claim because of a governmental 
failure to intercept alleged IP-infringing, in transit61 medicines via stringent border 
measures.  This too might violate the right to “fair and equitable treatment” in 
administrative border procedures.  In the pharmaceutical context, drug companies have 
initiated seizures of medicines-in-transit on multiple occasions in Europe, not because they 
violated IP rights in the countries of origin or destination, but because they interfered with 
fictional patent rights in the transit country.62    Admittedly, the US TPP IP Chapter Proposal 
on border measures, Art. 14.1, instructs customs official to apply the law of the importing 
country, as required by TRIPS.  However, trademark-related IP rights, including those 
involving confusingly similar drug names or trade dress, might be enforced through 
investor-state proceedings based on misunderstanding of the governing law and of 
trademark status in the importing country. 
 
D. The compulsory licensing and bracketed patenting exception in the Draft TPP 
Investment Chapter are insufficient to protect Parties’ legitimate interests to 
access affordable medicines 
 
Bracketed subparagraph 1(f) of Art. 12.7 prohibits a TPP Party from imposing or enforcing 
any investment-related requirement or enforcing any investment-related commitment or 
undertaking “to transfer a particular technology, a production process or other proprietary 
knowledge to a person in its territory.”63  If left in this form, such a provision could doom 
the right to issue compulsory or government use licenses.  To partially remedy this 
problem, subparagraph 12.7.3(b)(i) eliminates this requirement where a TRIPS Art. 31, 
unauthorized-use license (or alternatively a TPP-compliant unauthorized-use license64) has 
been issued.65  Similarly, with respect to Art. 12.12, which prohibits the expropriation or 
nationalization of a covered investment either directly or indirectly, subparagraph 5 creates 
an exception for the issuance of compulsory licenses granted pursuant to the TRIPS 
Agreement.  In addition, there is a bracketed addition to subparagraph 5 that extends the 
exception against prohibited expropriation or nationalization to other IP-related acts:  “or 
to the revocation, limitation, or creation of IP rights, to the extent that such issuance, 
revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with Chapter __ (IP rights).”66 
                                                        
61 The US TPP IP Chapter expressly covers goods in transit, Art. 14.4.  Note, although Article 14 does not directly 
cover patent or data rights, medicines can get caught up in border measures based on claims that they their 
names or markings are confusingly similar to a registered trademark.  One such case involved the seizure of 
medicines bearing the international non-proprietary name amoxicillin, which German border agents considered 
to be confusingly similar to the brand name drug, Amoxil.  Christian Wagner‐Ahlfs, Seizure of Indian generic 
amoxicillin in Frankfurt, ESSENTIALDRUGS.ORG, available at 
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200906/msg00014.php.  
62 See Request for Consultations by India, European Union – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408 
(May 11, 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm; Request for 
Consultations by Brazil, European Union – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.htm.  
63 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23. 
64 The proponent of this bracketed alternative, presumably, the US, would seem to hope that TPP-compliant 
unauthorized uses might be narrower than TRIPS Article31-compliant unauthorized uses.  By using the 
“unauthorized use” language, the bracketed text would exclude limited exceptions under Article 30 of TRIPS and 
would further exclude judicially granted licenses under Article 44.2. 
65 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23.  Subparagraph 3(b)(ii) creates an exception to permit remedies 
for anti-competitive practices.  There are additional limited exceptions for environmental measures, 
subparagraph 3(c), government procurement, subparagraph 3(e), and other matters. 
66 Id.  Note, there are additional exceptions for non-conforming performance requirement measures detailed in 
Article 12.9.  Pursuant to Article 12.9.2, performance requirements for specific sectors, subsectors, or activities 
are permissible via a negotiated negative list. 
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These provisions individually and collectively create a partial but incomplete safe haven for 
only some of the government action that is entirely lawful under TRIPS.67  For example, 
TRIPS Article 31, referenced in the bracketed language of TPP Art. 12.7.3(b)(i) and Art. 
12.12.5, covers only a portion of legally issued licenses under TRIPS.  Specifically, the 
referenced TRIPS-CL language does not directly reference proposed TRIPS Article 31bis or 
the current waiver of Article 31(f) found in the Paragraph 6 System.68  Likewise, the 
bracketed Draft TPP Investment Chapter language on compulsory licensing in subparagraph 
3(b)(i) and the unbracketed TRIPS-compulsory licensing language in Art. 12.12.5 do not 
allow the possibility of judicially authorized compulsory licenses such as those granted in 
the U.S. in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.69 and its progeny and in India in Roche v. Cipla.70  
Such judicial licenses are directly authorized by Article 44.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.71  
Moreover, as discussed previously, the bracketed subparagraph (5) does not completely 
preclude challenges to adverse IP-related decisions or policy changes. 
 
E. The limitations on performance requirements will interfere with ensuring 
redundant sources of medicines and legitimate technology transfer and 
industrial development 
 
Article 12.7.1(b), subject to certain exceptions, prohibits a Party, with respect to foreign 
investor rights, from imposing requirements in order to achieve a given level or percentage 
of domestic content.72   Many countries have used such “performance” provisions in the past 
as a development strategy to grow their economies via local content rules and related 
technology transfer/local working rules.  To similar effect, Article 12.7.1(h) prohibits 
Parties from purchasing, using, or according preferences to their own domestic 
technologies. 73   Most developed countries, including the US, achieved industrial 
development in part by fostering rules requiring local content, by favoring local industries, 
and by procuring and purchasing domestically.  Now the US is intent on kicking away the 
technology ladder and preventing countries from also developing industrial policy to grow 
their technological base and industrial capacity.74   
 
The TRIPS Agreement has vague and largely unenforced obligations to ensure technology 
transfer to least developed countries,75 but some countries have taken matters into their 
                                                        
67 TRIPS currently allows many other flexibilities including limitations and exceptions, exemptions, opposition 
procedures, exhaustion rules, definitions of patentability, etc.  Supra note 26. 
68 Supra note 42. 
69 547 U.S. 388, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
70 CS (OS) No.89/2008. 
71 TRIPS, supra note 26:  “Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Part and provided that the provisions of 
Part II specifically addressing use by governments, or by third parties authorized by a government, without the 
authorization of the right holder are complied with, Members may limit the remedies available against such use 
to payment of remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the remedies 
under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments 
and adequate compensation shall be available.” (Emphasis added.) 
72 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23. 
73 Id. 
74 See Ha Joon Chang, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (London, Anthem 
Press 2002); Brook K. Baker, Debunking IP-for-Development:  Africa Needs IP Space Not IP Shackles (2013 
submitted for publication Law & Development Review).; cf. Suerie Moon, Meaningful Technology Transfer to 
LDCs:  A Proposal for a Monitoring Mechanism for TRIPS Article 66.2, ICTSD Policy Brief No. 9 (2011), available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/05/technology-transfer-to-the-ldcs.pdf.  
75 See TRIPS, supra note 26, Articles 7 and 66.2. 
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own hands to try to preserve sovereign rights to promote technological advancement, 
particularly in important areas like pharmaceuticals.  For example, both India and Brazil 
have local production/local working rules in their compulsory licensing schemes that 
authorize the grant of compulsory licenses when local working, other than by importation, 
is not achieved.  The U.S. filed a WTO complaint against Brazil on this issue in 2001, but the 
complaint was voluntarily dismissed in accordance with a consultation compromise.76  
Although Brazil has never used the challenged local-working provision, India has just 
granted its first statutory compulsory license based in part on Bayer’s failure to produce 
any content locally.77 
 
Preserving sovereign rights to try to maintain or to develop local pharmaceutical capacity is 
critical to access to medicines not only to industrialization.  When a rightholder has 
exclusive rights to a single source of supply, there are frequently monopoly-based 
affordability problems, but there are also high risks of interrupted supply if manufacturing, 
capacity, or quality assurance problems occur.  Many countries choose to develop local 
pharmaceutical capacity precisely in order to ensure that they have locally managed 
sources of supply of essential life-saving medicines to supplement potentially fragile 
supplies available from only one or a small number of producers on the global market.   
 
III. The Eli Lilly v. Canada Case:  A Pharmaceutical Investor-State Claim Gone Wild78 
 
The hypothetical risks of investor-state claims in the investor-state dispute resolution 
context have now become real.  On November 2, 2012, Eli Lilly filed a claim for $100 million 
(Canadian)79 against Canada because the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal had invalidated 
Eli Lilly’s patent on Strattera in a declaratory judgment brought by Teva Canada.80  In 
reaching its invalidation decision, the Federal Court of Appeals addressed three issues – did 
the trial judge err by invalidating the patent for lack of demonstrated utility by 
misconstruing its promise, by requiring too high a standard of utility, and deciding that Eli 
Lilly could not rely on the sound prediction of utility of the invention because the limited 
                                                        
76 See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds199_e.htm.  
77 Natco Pharma Ltd v Bayer Corporation—Compulsory Licence Application No 1 of 2011 (Controller of Patents, 
Mumbai), 9 March 2012, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf.   
Although on review the Intellectual Property Appellate Board slightly modified the local working standard 
adopted by the Comptroller of Patents, the local working rule still has vitality in India.  See IPAB decision, supra 
note 25. 
78 This analysis relies substantially on a Public Citizen report, U.S. Pharmaceutical Corporation Uses NAFTA 
Foreign Investor Privileges Regime to Attack Canada’s Patent Policy, Demand $100 Million for Invalidation of a 
Patent (March 2013), available at https://www.citizen.org/eli-lilly-investor-state-factsheet.  
79 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 8, at ¶ 108.  Although the Eli Lilly case is the first investor-state claim to be filed, 
there may be others in the works.  For example, Eli Lilly, in its complaint, indicated its probable intention to sue 
make and investor-state claim if its patent on Zyprexa, an anti-schizophrenia drug, is invalidated.  Id. at ¶ 48.  
There are also rumors that Pfizer might be preparing an investor-state claim based on the invalidation of its 
patent on Viagra, a well-known erectile dysfunction medicine, for a failure to disclose the critical active 
pharmaceutical ingredient.   See Luke Eric Peterson, U.S. Pharma Corp Puts Canada on Notice of NAFTA Claim 
following Patent Invalidation at Hands of Canadian Court; More Such Claims in Wings?, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 
REPORTER (Dec. 3, 2012), available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20121203_2.  There has previously 
been NAFTA claims against the U.S. by Apotex, Inc. with respect to its inability to have a 180-day exclusivity 
period as a first generic entrant, where another generic company had been the first to challenge the underlying 
patent but had settled with the patent holder.  This case relates to intellectual property rights because it involves 
challenges thereto, but the technical rule on marketing exclusivity rights is contained in Food and Drug 
Administration statutes and regulations.  See Apotex, Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/12/1, available at http://italaw.com/cases/1687.  
80 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 76-81. 
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and short term study that it relied on was not disclosed in the patent application and 
because it did not  an adequate factual foundation of the sound prediction/promise of the 
patent?81  The principle evidence weighed by the Federal Court of Appeals was the patent 
application itself and a 21-person three-week, double-blind placebo cross-over study that 
showed a 30% greater reduction of ADHD in 11 of 21 patients.82  In a nutshell, the Federal 
Court of Appeals ruled that this short-term study was not revealed in the patent even 
though it should have been and that even if it had been the study would have been 
insufficient to predict, as claimed and promised, that Strattera would be an effective long-
term treatment of chronic attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.83  In terms of the 
governing legal standard, the Federal Court of Appeals held that the utility of a patent is 
determined by inventive promise that the applicant has made either directly or by “sound 
prediction” and that such a promise or sound prediction must rest on disclosure made in 
the patent application.84   
 
In its investor-state arbitration claim, Lilly asserts that both the promise doctrine and the 
disclosure requirement go well beyond normal practice and that these additional 
requirements are not found in the Patent Cooperation Treaty.85  In essence, Eli Lilly seeks to 
challenge both the invalidation of its patent and the Canadian promise/disclosure utility 
doctrine in its entirety.86  Eli Lilly is pursuing claim with respect to a minimum standard of 
treatment, indirect expropriation, and national treatment discrimination.  Although the first 
two claims are far fetched, they are at least within the arbitral ballpark.  On the other hand, 
the third claim, national treatment discrimination, is hallucinatory, but even so is expensive 
to defend and dangerous in the face of the relatively unbridled discretion of arbitral 
tribunals. 
 
With respect to minimum standard of treatment, Eli Lilly is drawing on the arbitral 
investment doctrine that investors are entitled to compensation for violation of a minimum 
standard of treatment whenever their expectations of profit are unjustly unsettled by a 
foreign government’s policies or actions, in this case judicial reinterpretation and 
development of patent law requirements.  Eli Lilly claims that the judge-made law and 
Canada’s imposition of higher patent standards than those used elsewhere, including “new 
and addition requirements [promise/disclosure]” 87  contravened its “most basic and 
legitimate expectations of a stable business and legal environment.”88 It argues that at the 
time of filing its patent application it “could not have anticipated that the requirement for 
utility at the time of its investment (a “mere scintilla”) would be so drastically altered by the 
adoption into Canadian law and practice of the doctrine of ‘promise of the patent’ … .”89 As 
                                                        
81 Eli Lilly v. Teva, supra note 19, at ¶ 3. 
82 Id. at ¶¶ 10-14. 
83 Id. at ¶¶ 46-51. 
84 Id. 
85 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 70-81.  The Patent Cooperation Treaty establishes the World Intellectual 
Property Organization as a clearinghouse for patent application in treaty member states.  Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf.  The PTC specifies a 
procedural standard and common format for PCT applications and it conducts a preliminary international 
search and report on prior art.  However, patent applications must be perfected and prosecuted in each member 
country that the applicant has designated, and the patent application must satisfy the substantive law of each 
nation state.  WIPO, PCT Applicant’s Guide – National Phase, ¶¶ 6.001, 6.013-.17, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol2/pdf/gdvol2.pdf.  
86 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 42-43. 
87 Id. at ¶ 99. 
88 Id. at ¶ 100. 
89 Id. at ¶ 101. 
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of the time of its investment, Lilly argues that it “reasonably relied on disclosure obligations 
that were enshrined in domestic law through incorporation by reference of PCT 
requirements and could not have anticipated that non-statutory, new and additional 
disclosure obligations adopted years later would be retroactively applied to invalidate the 
Strattera Patent.”90   In sum, “The measures ... violated the ‘full protection and security’ 
requirement of Article 1105(12), which likewise includes basic requirements of legal 
security.”91  
 
With respect to expropriation, Eli Lilly claims both direct and indirect expropriation.92  The 
direct expropriation claim is preposterous given unanimous jurisprudence limiting that 
concept to governmental seizure of real property.93  The indirect expropriation claim, on the 
other hand, is more subtle.  Here Eli Lilly claims that:  
The judicial decisions invalidating the Strattera patent are illegal from the 
perspective of international law and therefore constitute an expropriation  
(emphasis added). … The Government of Canada has a positive obligation to ensure 
Canadian law complies with Canada’s international treaty obligations, as well as the 
reasonable investment-backed expectations of the investor.94 
 
In support of its non-reliance on Canadian national law and norms, nor even on NAFTA 
undertakings, as the basis for its “legitimate expectations” but rather external sources, Eli 
Lilly alleges that Canada’s promise/disclosure rules on violate:  (1) the TRIPS Agreement, 
which was not even operative when NAFTA was negotiated,95 (2) the PCT, which expressly 
covers procedural elements of patent applications, not substantive patenting standards,96 
and (3) the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,97 which literally has 
no relevant provision on standards for deciding utility.98  In drawing on each of these 
treaties, Eli Lilly is advancing the novel proposition that its reasonable expectation of profits 
are not merely drawn from “representations” instantiated in Canada’s preexisting legal 
framework for defining and protecting intellectual property nor from undertaking in the 
operative investment clause treaty, in this case NAFTA.  Instead, Eli Lilly is saying that its 
reasonable expectations of profits derive from phantom representations made in 
international treaties, including those not directly applicable in terms of timeliness or 
defining utility-doctrine and disclosure-requirement norms.  Eli Lilly has probably chosen 
to try to rely on extra-NAFTA texts because NAFTA’s IP chapter explicitly grants NAFTA 
Members flexibility how to define “usefulness,” meaning that Canada’s promise doctrine, 
though unique is NAFTA compliant.   
 
In relation to this claim it is important to note that Eli Lilly is making an indirect 
expropriation claim despite a provision in NAFTA that is essentially identical to the 
proposed clause in the Draft TPP Investment Chapter supposedly creating a safe haven for 
                                                        
90 Id. at ¶ 102 
91 Id. at ¶ 103. 
92 Id. at ¶¶ 90-91. 
93 Public Citizen, supra note 61, at 7. 
94 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 92, 95. 
95 The TRIPS Agreement, concluded in 1994 and with an effective date of 1995, is mentioned twelve times in the 
Notice of Intent. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9-11, 17, 32, 42, 52, 55, 63, 93, and 96. 
96 The PCT, which Canada had signed before NAFTA, is mentioned fourteen times in the Notice of Intent.  Id. at 
19-21, 23-26, 59-60, 63, 66, 68, 82, and 93.   
97 The Paris Convention is only mention in paragraph 34 and 93(v), and the only reference is to the national 
treatment obligations of the treaty – nothing about utility. 
98 Id. at ¶ 93. 
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compulsory licenses and for patenting decisions.  The relevant NAFTA provision, Article 
1110(7) reads as follows:  “This Article [Expropriation and Compensation] does not apply to 
the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to 
the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such 
issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen 
(Intellectual Property).” 99   Despite this clause sheltering NAFTA-compliant patent 
revocations from expropriation disciplines, Eli Lilly has made claims not just based on 
NAFTA’s IP chapter and the Paris Convention incorporated by reference but on IP rules 
misrepresented and imported from non-NAFTA treaties.100  
 
The last investment claims made by Eli Lilly against Canada charge national treatment 
discrimination.  It is here that Eli Lilly efforts to incorporate foreign IP norms reaches its 
apex.  Remember, national treatment requires countries to allow foreign investors 
treatment that is no less favorable than that granted to domestic corporations in like 
circumstances.101  However, instead of comparing equal treatment under domestic law, “Eli 
Lilly invents a standard that would require Canada to afford foreign investors treatment no 
less favorable than that afforded under the laws of the foreign investor’s home countries 
(emphasis in the original).”102  Thus, in paragraph 106 of its investor-state complaint, Eli 
Lilly states:   
The measures in issue disadvantage foreign nationals and render their patents 
especially vulnerable to attack by insisting on proof of utility and disclosure of 
evidence that is not required by the foreign applicants' own national jurisdictions or 
international rules.  The measures in issue de facto discriminate against Lilly, a U.S. 
investor, when compared to domestic investors, by requiring the Strattera patent 
(which was filed on the basis of an international application) to meet elevated and 
additional standards for utility and disclosure that are not required by the laws of 
the United States of America, the European Union, or the harmonized PCT [Patent 
Cooperation Treaty] rules.  The measures in issue disadvantage foreign nationals 
and render their patents especially vulnerable to attack by insisting on proof of 
utility and disclosure of evidence that is not required by the foreign applicants’ own 
national jurisdictions or international rules. (Emphases added.)103 
 
Notice, what has become a recurring, indeed dominant feature of Eli Lilly’s investor claim – 
that its reasonable expectations may be drawn not just from preexisting Canadian laws and 
practices, but rather from higher external standards such as utility rules and disclosure 
norms in other countries.  Moreover, it argues that the procedural and formalistic 
requirement that WIPO administers under the Patent Cooperation Treaty supersede 
substantive disclosure requirement contained in national law.   
 
                                                        
99 Cf. Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23, Articles 12.7.3(b)(i) and 12.12.5. 
100 NAFTA, supra note 19, Article 1701(2) names only four specific international agreements to which 
signatories are obligated domesticate into their national law:  conventions on phonograms, literary and artistic 
works, industrial property, and plant varieties.  Accordingly, it is only the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property is properly referenced in the Eli Lilly complaint – TRIPS and the PCT should be considered 
completely irrelevant. 
101 Draft TPP Investment Chapter supra note 23, Article 12.4. 
102 Public Citizen, supra note 76, at 6. 
103 Eli Lilly v. Canada, supra note 8, at ¶ 106.  This is the first time that Eli Lilly expressly clarified its claim that it 
was entitled to the benefit of U.S. and E.U. law, but it had referenced U.S. law seven times previously, ¶¶ 12, 14, 
15, 29, and 84-86.  It had referenced E.U. law four previous times, ¶¶ 13, 16, 22, 30. 
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As a final feature of this topsy-turvy analysis – that “my treatment in your country must be 
equal not just to treatment you provide to domestic firms but also to the better treatment I 
get in my country or anywhere else in the world” – Eli Lilly argues that Canada’s patent 
invalidations somehow advantage Canadian generic companies that can now freely produce 
and market generic versions of Strattera thereby being able to reap the economic benefits 
associated with Lilly’s investments, thus destroying Lilly’s [exclusive] market share and 
associated profits.104  Naturally, every patent invalidation or denial “opens the door” to 
competition because it precludes the exercise of exclusive rights.  However, such 
invalidations or denials can result in competition not just by domestic producers but also by 
producers from any other country where a patent bar does not exist.   
 
IV. Conclusion:  Strike the Investment Chapter or Otherwise Limits its Application to 
IPRs 
 
Under the logic of Eli Lilly’s investor-state claim, foreign investors’ expectations have now 
become unbound.  Even the doctrine of legitimate expectations, which is itself a huge 
stretch of operative minimum standard of treatment principles, is no longer tethered to 
operative due process (minimum standard of treatment) or to promises of regulatory 
coherence (indirect expropriation) or to equal treatment compared to domestic firms 
(national treatment).  Instead Eli Lilly hitches its investment expectation to the best deal on 
IP achieved anywhere else.  Moreover, it suggests that its expectations tolerate movement 
on IP policy in only one direction – upward.  Any reversal of IP maximalization would dilute 
the gleam in its eye – unlimited profits on the horizon. 
 
The practical implications of this radical assertion of investor privilege is two-fold.  First, 
foreign IP investors, mainly from rich countries, could now directly sue virtually any 
government, rich or poor, to enforce any and all IP-related treaties and/or the highest 
standard of comparable national law found anywhere in the world.  These investor 
prerogatives sit on top of state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms under TRIPS and 
other trade agreements.  They sit on top of more stringent border and criminal enforcement 
measures that consume state resources. They sit on top of state-state investment clause 
dispute resolution.  And they sit on top of new deterrent civil remedies, mandatory 
injunction rights and draconian damages.  In other word, IP rightholders enforcement 
options are now unbound. 
 
Second, a tribunal of three private international trade lawyers will now sit as an ad hoc 
subcommittee with power to review and veto every sovereign decision affecting the 
intellectual property rights of Big Pharma.  Rejecting an IP-related trade pact, i.e. the U.S.-
SACU FTA,105 refusing to join an IP enforcement treaty such as the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement,106 tightening up standards of patentability legislatively, administratively, 
or judicially, 107  instituting new opposition procedures, 108  rejecting patent term 
                                                        
104 Id. at ¶ 107. 
105 See Drusilla K. Brow, Kozo Kiyota, & Robert M. Stern, An Analysis of the U.S.-SACU FTA Negotiations, IPC 
Working Paper Series Number 17, (2006), available at 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/41235/IPC-working-paper-017-
BrownKiyotaStern.pdf?sequence=1.  
106 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was rejected by the European Parliament on 4 July 2012, 
see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120217BKG38488/html/ACTA-before-
the-European-Parliament.    
107 See Adoption of Guidelines for Patentability Examination of Patent Applications Directed to Chemical and 
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extensions,109 granting compulsory licenses,110 shortening data and marketing exclusivity 
on biologics,111 creating a new bio-similars pathway,112 allowing parallel importation of 
medicines as the US Supreme Court did with textbooks113 – all of these could potentially 
result in an investor suit and unappealable arbitral review.  In other words, foreign IP 
rightholders opportunities to oversee and set national IP policy and to ratchet it upwards is 
also now unbound. 
 
Unbounded intellectual property rights are oxymoronic given that they are purely and 
completely based on allowance and recognition by governments.114  Although IP right 
holders like to elevate their exclusive rights into the realm of natural law, IPRs are most 
commonly recognized as instrumental rights that balance incentives for innovations, 
investment in quality, and creativity against access and ins some instances disclosure, as is 
the case for patent rights.  As creatures of legislative and judicial balancing, IPRs are granted 
and modified according to changing social circumstances and technologies.  They can be 
strengthened or weakened, lengthened or shortened, and broadened or narrowed by 
limitations and exceptions.  To argue that they set forth a stable, durable set of entitlements 
that can only be strengthened is naïve at best and duplicitous at worst.  It is 
disinformational for drug companies to claim that compulsory licenses are confiscatory, 
since governments rights to issue compulsory license has been codified in the Paris 
Convention for nearly 130 years115 and since the governments that have issued compulsory 
licenses or government use orders on medicines have had rights to do so enshrined in their 
national legislation for decades.  Similarly, it is disingenuous to claim a violation of a 
minimum standard of treatment or of national treatment simply because you dislike a 
particular country’s standard of patentability and because you obtain patents in other 
countries according to less stringent standards of patentability. 
 
There are many reasons to strike the Draft TPP Investment Chapter, a chapter that 
dramatically increases corporate power at the same time that it restricts government 
sovereignty to regulate foreign and domestic business activities and to afford the 
enforcement of IP-related claims on an even-handed basis in domestic forums.  However, 
too little attention has been given to the grave risks that the Investment Chapter poses to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Pharmaceutical Inventions (2012), available at 
http://www.moellerip.com/index.php?PN=news_detail&FX=0&DX=139&EX=1.  
108 The 2011 America Invents Act radically revises the U.S. system of post-grant patent review, by providing four 
new post-grant opposition proceedings in addition to existing ex parte reexamination.  See amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 
312 and 313. 
109 India is reported to have rejected patent term extensions in its free trade agreement negotiations with the 
European Union.  See leak draft of latest Negotiating Text, EU/India FTA , available at 
http://keionline.org/node/1691.  
110 India, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia, Ecuador, and many others countries have granted compulsory licenses on 
medicines, including several European countries.  See Reed Beall & Randall Kyhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing 
of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MEDICINE e1001154 (2012), available 
at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001154.  
111 See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 351(k)(7).  Information concerning 
compulsory licenses in Indonesia and India can be found supra in notes 25 and 44. 
112 At the end of March 2010, the United States enacted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act 
(BPCI), the long awaited US pathway to biosimilars, though operation of this pathway is still dependent on 
regulatory action by the FDA. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k).  Europe has had an established pathway for biosimilars since 
2005.  European Medicines Authority Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use, CHMP/437/04 London, 
30 October 2005. 
113 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2013). 
114 Naturally, all property rights, intellectual or real, are granted and enforced by government. 
115 Paris Convention, supra note 46, Art. 5(A)(2).  
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access to medicines.116  Big Pharma has had a big hand in the US’s proposed TPP IP Chapter 
and now in the Investment Chapter as well.  Negotiating parties should reject both TRIPS-
plus IP standards and enforcement measures and substantive investment clause provisions 
and investor-state dispute resolution that will needlessly tie their hands in helping to 
safeguard the health of their people.  Accordingly, the best solution with respect to IP-
specific investment claims, and to the broader risks of investor-state claims altogether, is to 
delete the Investment Chapter entirely.  There is no compelling reason why foreign 
investors should have rights that are not available to domestic investors nor are 
investments so different in kind from trade in goods and services that they are entitled to 
special substantive and enforcement protections. 
 
The second-best solution to the risk of dangerous investor-state arbitral proceedings is to 
explicitly exclude IPRs from the Draft TPP Investment Chapter and to clarify that IPRs are 
not even indirectly protected by the definition of “investment.”  This solution could best be 
accomplished by an addition to Art. 12.3: “4.  This Chapter does not apply with respect to 
the enforcement of any rights conferred pursuant to Chapter __ (Intellectual Property) or 
any other intellectual property rights contained in any other trade agreement, international 
treaty, or national legislation of any other country.”   
 
Either of these solutions would force foreign IP rightholders to assert their IP-related claims 
in domestic courts, just as domestic IP companies must do. By excluding investor-state IPR 
claims, Parties could obtain sovereign control over the determination of IP standards and 
the adjudication of IP rights, retain freedom to develop their own IP jurisprudence, and 
relegate rightholders to pursue their claims in country courts alleging adjudicative and 
administrative improprieties, confiscatory measures, or other government wrongdoing.  
There would as well be supplemental protection pursuant to state-to-state dispute 
resolution with respect to alleged violation of intellectual property norms established in the 
TPP.   
 
The third-best solution is to adopt the bracketed language that allows investor claims only 
with respect to IP rights actually granted by the Party under its existing IP laws and hope 
that the far-fetched investor claims that Eli Lilly has asserted against Canada will be 
summarily dismissed and discredited.  Limiting foreign IP “investors” to IP rights and 
expectations grounded purely in changeable domestic law, rather than their wish-list of 
externally established maximalist rights, might avoid abusive investor-state claims seeking 
to enforce ephemeral claims and yet unrealized rights under TRIPS, the TPP, or even the 
national law of Parties.117 
 
Although solutions to the risk of unbounded corporate power to enforce IP rights in 
investor-state dispute resolution exist, those solutions will not be adopted if countries 
remain unvigilant and if activists do not continue to highlight the risks of such claims.  The 
                                                        
116 Of course, the dangers are not limited to access to medicines.  There have already been multiple foreign 
investor challenges to public health measures such as tobacco control and environmental toxins and 
degradation.  But, conceivably there are foreign investor risks with respect to tightening labor standards, to 
adopting minimum wages, to enacting climate control regulations, to seeking access to green technologies, to 
sourcing educational materials and scientific journals, and many other matters of public interest, social justice, 
and human rights concern. 
117 The author appreciates the comments and suggestions of Ben Beachy on this paper and of Peter Maybarduk 
and Sanya Smith on an previous related paper.  I also appreciate the contributions of faculty colleagues at 
Northeastern U. School of Law at a faculty scholarship luncheon where I presented this paper on April 10, 2013.. 
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risks concerning access to medicine are relatively clear and dramatic – lives are at stake.  
However, the risks are equally severe with respect to tobacco control, environmental 
hazards, and many other matters implicating human rights and social justice.  It is time for 
legal academics and diverse social movements to shine an illuminating light on the danger 
of ever expanding corporate power and of private arbitration of public interests.  The most 
immediate concern may well be the intersection of the US TPP IP Chapter and the Draft TPP 
Investment Chapters, but there are similar dangers in the soon-to-be concluded EU-India 
FTA as well.  If investor power remains unchecked, the weapon of investor-state claims will 
be used against poor countries and rich countries alike and monopoly power will become 
even further entrenched to the detriment of us all. 
 
